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AVENUES FOR PRIVATE CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: 
THE ADVANCEMENT OF A SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS APPROACH 
 
Forthcoming in Climate Litigation in Africa Conference Proceedings 
 
Pia Rebelo* and Xavier Rebelo† 
 
Abstract 
 
A second wave of climate litigation targeting private defendants has gained momentum due 
to advances in attribution science and the legal discourse surrounding the responsibility of 
‘carbon majors’ who knowingly pollute. At the same time, rights-based arguments are seeing 
increasing success in public litigation targeting governments who fail to take appropriate action 
to prevent climate change. This Paper explores the potential for rights-based arguments in the 
private context, specifically on the African continent. It argues that the horizontal application 
of an environmental right, both directly and indirectly, enjoys firm judicial recognition in certain 
African jurisdictions. As a result, Africa is ripe for substantive engagement with environmental 
rights and their application to private entities despite having few cases of climate litigation. 
More narrowly, this Paper investigates the constitutional milieu of the South African right to a 
healthy environment and argues for a substantive engagement with the transformative nature 
of such a right as opposed to relying solely on procedural approaches to obtaining 
environmental justice. 
 
Keywords: [Climate; Litigation; South Africa; Rights-based; Environmental] 
 
Introduction 
Whilst the majority of strategic climate litigation cases (around 80%) have targeted 
governments, an increasing number of private actors are cited as defendants, in particular 
fossil fuel companies known as the ‘carbon majors’.1 Although initial attempts at suing private 
                                               
* PhD Candidate, The City Law School, City, University of London. 
† PhD Candidate, Departments of Law and Environment Sciences, University of Cape Town. 
1 Joana Setzer and Rebecca Byrnes, Global trends in climate change litigation: 2019 snapshot (2019 
policy report) London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and 
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and Political 
Science. 
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entities for climate change harm were largely unsuccessful, scientific advancements in 
quantifying the carbon contributions of polluters has enabled a second wave of private climate 
litigation which is creatively engaging with corporate governance, responsible investing, and 
reporting and disclosure requirements.2 These successes have also been supported by the 
growing popularity of rights-based approaches in climate litigation more generally. An evolving 
constitutional context, which elevates environmental protection to a core element of 
democracy and human welfare, is enabling a normative framework for the governance of both 
public and private legal relationships. Perhaps, even more useful in empowering a new era of 
private climate litigation is an increasing judicial acceptance of the horizontal application of 
environmental rights. Given the enshrinement of environmental and associated rights in many 
African constitutions, Africa has contributed significantly to the jurisprudence on horizontality 
despite having few climate change cases. This has been supported by other emerging trends 
in the Global South which are highlighting the overwhelming vulnerability of certain 
populations and the monumental rights infringements stemming from present and future 
climate disasters. This Paper presents the untapped potential of Africa’s environmental rights 
jurisprudence as a successful litigation strategy for targeting private entities partly responsible 
for climate change. Many African constitutions permit substantive engagement with socio-
economic and environmental rights, which places Africa at a unique advantage in respect of 
private environmental disputes. South Africa, having a particularly developed environmental 
law framework, is also considerably apt for climate change disputes of this kind despite not 
yet enacting its Climate Change Bill. 
The Scope of this Paper does not extend to an evaluation of the effectiveness of private 
climate litigation as a tool for combatting greater climate injustice; nor does it promote the 
targeting of ‘carbon majors’ or propose litigation for an instrumental purpose, namely forcing 
private entities to stop emitting greenhouse gases and to pay for the harm caused by their 
irresponsible environmental behaviour. This Paper is confined to an analysis of one strategy 
of private climate litigation – rights-based private climate litigation, and its promising prospects 
within an African context. Accordingly, this Paper first addresses developments in private 
climate litigation and highlights significant trends. It briefly outlines the failings of the first wave 
of private climate change litigation and illustrates the new approaches which characterise the 
more successful second wave. Second, this Paper discusses how a rights-based approach 
(ordinarily applicable to government-targeted litigation) has immense potential for application 
to private disputes – this is particularly true in an African context where environmental rights 
enjoy constitutional inclusion. Third, this Paper recounts how a horizontal application of 
                                               
2 Geetanjali Ganguly, Joana Setzer, and Veerle Heyvaert, ‘If at First you don’t Succeed: Suing 
Corporations for Climate Change’ (2018) 38 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 841. 
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environmental and associated rights has enjoyed firm judicial recognition on the continent of 
Africa. Finally, this Paper narrows its lens to the South African context and observes that a 
transformative constitutional ambiance and horizontally-enforceable environmental right 
positions the country at the precipice of contributing meaningfully to the global private climate 
litigation discourse.     
1. Private Climate Change Litigation: Where we Stand Now 
The potential for a rights-based private climate litigation approach requires some 
conceptualisation before evaluating its potential within an African and, more specifically, South 
African context. At the outset, the focus of this article is on private climate litigation, however, 
the burgeoning successes of this type of litigation cannot be viewed in isolation from the 
developments occurring in wider public climate litigation efforts. Private climate litigation refers 
to the litigious strategy of holding private entities responsible for their contributions to climate 
change and the resultant harm caused to human beings – the harm element often manifesting 
itself as rights violations. Longer term goals include remoulding corporate behaviour through 
presenting significant legal and, ultimately, financial risks to companies who fail to uphold a 
set of environmental standards – this is similar to its counterpart, strategic public climate 
litigation, which aims to exert influence over public policy or attain injunctive relief in respect 
of public projects.3 In understanding the current milieu of private climate litigation efforts, it is 
important to briefly acknowledge its evolution to pinpoint the major developments which 
underpin recent successes. 
  
Private climate litigation has evolved in two waves with contrasting success rates. The first 
wave of private climate litigation, primarily based on public nuisance claims in the USA, 
commenced in the early 2000s and was mainly targeted at oil, gas and electric companies.4 
Two major hurdles compromised the success of this string of cases; namely, locus standi and 
causation.5 In the USA, defendants were able to rely on arguments of standing jurisprudence 
involving political question doctrines, as the US Constitution permits a federal court jurisdiction 
only where: (i) the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact; (ii) that is ‘fairly traceable’ to the 
defendant’s misconduct (causation); and (iii) is capable of being redressed by the court.6 On 
an arguably incorrect application of Article III of the US Constitution, what was initially created 
to limit lawsuits against federal agencies somehow became a barrier for private citizens in 
                                               
3 Geetanjali Ganguly et al op cit note 2 at 843. 
4 Characterised by Kivalina v ExxonMobil Corporation et al 696 F.3d 849, 2012 WL 4215921 (9th Cir 
2012) and Comer v Murphy Oil USA Inc 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir 2010). 
5 Geetanjali Ganguly et al op cit note 2 at 847. 
6 Mary Kathryn Nagle, ‘Tracing the Origins of Fairly Traceable: The Black Hole of Private Climate 
Change Litigation’ (2010) 85 Tulse Law Review 477. 
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vindicating their rights.7 The ‘fairly traceable’ prong of standing jurisprudence also required 
that, ‘there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of - 
the injury has to be “fairly... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not 
...th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court."’8  
 
Progress was made in respect of this requirement in Massachusetts v Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA)9 where ‘mere contribution’ was enough for the Supreme Court to 
conclude that fairly traceable had been satisfied in a climate change context. However, the 
‘special solitude’ granted to states in the Massachusetts case was not extended to private 
plaintiffs, thereby denying private persons from suing government agencies and emission 
contributors.10 The doctrine of political question also excluded federal courts from considering 
matters considered exclusive to the executive branch. Causation was also factually 
challenging to prove as seen in the case of  Kivalina v ExxonMobil Corporation, where the 
federal court found that the plaintiffs were unable to show even a ‘substantial likelihood’ that 
ExxonMobil had caused the harm, nor was the harm ‘fairly traceable’ to ExxonMobil’s 
activities.11 
 
However, the discouraging precedents that lie in the wake of the first wave of private climate 
litigation did little to diminish fervour for the cause. This is evidenced by a second wave of 
private climate litigation that has garnered significant momentum. Although the second wave 
is still in its nascent stages, it is underpinned by a more diverse repertoire of arguments and 
litigation strategies than the first wave. The second wave of private climate litigation is also 
washing over shores of a rapidly evolving scientific, discursive and constitutional context.  It 
has been argued that this developing context spawns new opportunities for judicial officers to 
re-evaluate legal and evidentiary thresholds in a way that will elevate the accountability of 
private carbon emitters.12 This holds promise that the second wave of private climate litigation 
is not fated to follow the trajectory of its predecessor.  
 
The second wave largely consists of lawsuits filed against fossil fuel companies, known as the 
‘Carbon Majors’. This new wave of private climate litigation was inspired by scholarly analysis 
                                               
7 Ibid; Andrew E Hessick, ‘Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights (2008) 93 Cornell Law Review 
275 at 299. 
8 Justice Scalia in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992), quoting Simon v. E. 
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976). 
9 549 US 497 (2007), hereafter Massachusetts. 
10 Ibid at 520; ‘special solitude’ is a doctrine affording federal states the privilege of special 
consideration by the US Supreme Court. 
11 Kivalina op cit note 4. 
12 Geetanjali Ganguly et al op cit note 2. 
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that ascribes responsibility for climate change to major carbon emitters as determined by 
progressive scientific work in the field of attribution. 13 This work constitutes the substantive 
basis of the petition currently being investigated by the Human Rights Commission of the 
Philippines14 and appears to be encouraging a renewed appetite for major private climate 
cases against significant emitters.15 Indeed, there are at least 40 ongoing climate cases 
globally against Carbon Majors.16 These cases have been filed on a diverse assortment of 
grounds, ranging from liability suits which seek to reclaim damages resulting from climate 
change, allegations that corporations have defrauded shareholders and failed to report 
accurately on the effects of climate change risks on their business, ‘greenwashing’ claims, and 
claims concerning the infringement of human rights.  A significant challenge that continues to 
dog private climate litigation is that there is ‘no worn path to victory’.17 However, this has 
culminated in the emergence of creative private litigation strategies, each of which has only 
served to broaden the range of legitimate and science-backed arguments to enhance 
environmental responsibility. Although potentially disappointing for climate activists seeking a 
seismic moment in global accountability, various approaches which do not pursue ‘one road 
to Eldorado’, are equally necessary in achieving the incorporation of climate justice factors 
into all areas of public and private spheres.  
 
The most striking second-wave cases are largely premised on the idea that Carbon Majors, 
although fully cognisant of the implications of burning fossil fuels, continued to contribute 
significantly to greenhouse gas emissions that instigate climate change and should thus, 
accrue liability for the resulting damage.18 Examples of such liability cases against Carbon 
Majors include Lliuya v. RWE AG19, which is explored in further detail in the following section, 
and Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, Inc. v Chevron Corp & Ors 
(Chevron)20, in which an industry-representative body filed a claim in tort against a 
conglomeration of energy companies for their contribution to climate change. In the latter case, 
the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Association alleged that it had suffered losses as 
                                               
13 Richard Heede, ‘Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and 
Cement Producers, 1854–2010’ (2014) 122 Climate Change 229; Brenda Ekwurzel, James Boneham 
and Richard Heede, ‘The Rise in Global Atmospheric CO2, Surface Temperature, and Sea Level from 
Emissions Traced to Major Carbon Producers’ (2017) 144 Climate Change at 579. 
14 The text of the petition is available at, http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/PageFiles/735291/ 
Petitioners- and-Annexes/CC-HR-Petition.pdf, accessed 30 May 2018. 
15 Michael Burger and Justin Gundlach, ‘The Status of Climate Change Litigation: A Global Review’ 
(UN Environment Program and Sabin Center for Climate Change Law 2017). 
16 Joana Setzer and Rebecca Byrnes op cit note 1. 
17 Kim Bouwer, ‘The Unsexy Future of Climate Change Litigation’ (2018) 30 Journal of Environmental 
Law 483. 
18 Vic Sher, ‘Forum Versus Substance: Should Climate Damages Cases Be Heard in State or Federal 
Court?’ (2020 Synopsium - Lawyering in the Age of Climate Change) 32 Stanford Law Review. 
19 Case No. 2 O 285/15 Essen Regional Court. 
20 CGC-18-571285 California Superior Court. 
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a result of the defendants’ contributions to climate change and its associated negative impacts 
on commercial crab fisheries. This generates a sense of déjà vu, recalling the handful of failed 
tort claims that composed the first wave. However, these cases are underwritten by substantial 
advancements in climate attribution science, which may be pivotal in the acquisition of a 
successful outcome. 
 
The second wave of private climate litigation can be characterised by more than the mere 
fetishization of the impacts of past emissions, as litigants are also pursuing avenues to alter 
current and future corporate behaviour.21 In fact, more cases of climate litigation were filed 
against the financial sector last year than in any preceding year.22  Some of these cases were 
filed in relation to continued financial investment in carbon-intensive industries23, while others 
were brought by NGO’s and shareholders against pension funds and banks for a failure to 
consider climate-related risk in corporate decision-making and for the insufficient disclosure 
of climate risk.24 Particularly, litigants are more frequently alleging that corporations have 
breached the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises to compel these institutions to reconsider their business and 
investment models, as well as improve climate reporting in the context of altered risk.25 A 
handful of cases in the second wave have also alleged that corporations are misleading 
investors in relation to the material climate risks to their business.26 Similarly, ‘greenwashing’ 
has also come to the forefront of lawsuit allegations filed against Carbon Majors for 
inconsistencies between discourse and action. ‘Greenwashing’ refers to advertising 
campaigns which misrepresent the overall environmental performance of a company or the 
benefits of its products or services.27   
 
In respect of corporate governance, directors have also been targeted for their inaction in 
                                               
21 Joana Setzer and Rebecca Byrnes op cit note 1. 
22 Javier Solana, ‘Climate Litigation in Financial Markets: A Typology’ (2020) 9 Transnational 
Environmental Law at 103-135. 
23 Harvard Climate Justice Coalition & Others vs. President and Fellows of Harvard College & Others 
90 Mass. App. Ct. 444. 
24 See Mark McVeigh v. Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 14 (17 January 2019). 
25 On 8 May 2017 Oxfam Novib, Greenpeace, BankTrack and Friends of the Earth Netherlands 
(Milieudefensie) submitted a specific instance to the Dutch National Contact Point (NCP) alleging a 
violation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by ING Bank, Initial and Final 
Assessments available at, http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/database/instances/nl0029.htm, accessed 
25 July 2020. 
26 See City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 739 F. Supp. 2d 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
27 See Beyond Pesticides v. Exxon Mobil Corporation (1:20-cv-01815) District Court, District of 
Columbia (Last known filing July 10, 2020); also in December 2019, ClientEarth lawyers lodged a 
complaint against BP, alleging that BP’s global ‘Keep Advancing’ and ‘Possibilities Everywhere’ ad 
campaigns were misleading in their focus on BP’s low carbon energy products when more than 96% 
of BP’s annual spend is on oil and gas, available at, https://www.clientearth.org/bp-greenwashing-
complaint-sets-precedent-for-action-on-misleading-ad-campaigns/, accessed 25 July 2020. 
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responding to climate risk. In 2016, prominent Australian barristers, Noel Hutley and Sebastian 
Hartford-Davis, released an opinion relating to the extent to which Australian law permits 
company directors to respond to climate risk. The report, ‘Climate Change and Directors’ 
Liability’, finds that it is conceivable that directors who neglect to duly consider pertinent 
climate change risks may attract liability for breaching their duty of care and diligence.28 
Subsequently, the Centre for Policy Development in Australia augmented the 2016 opinion by 
emphasising five material developments since 2016 that have further elevated the need for 
directors to engage in board-level governance and duly consider climate risks. Ultimately, 
there is a growing understating that the ‘exposure of individual directors to “climate change 
litigation” is increasing, probably exponentially, with time’.29 
 
Ganguly et al attributes this uptick in private climate litigation to three major factors: 1) the 
scientific context, including development in attribution science to overcome causation hurdles; 
2) legal discourse, a growing understanding of responsible climate change behaviour and the 
precedential contribution of tobacco and asbestos litigation; and finally, 3) the constitutional 
context developments in which certain jurisdictions have constitutionalised environmental 
protection and extended judicial capacity to deal with climate change matters.30 
 
Scientific advancements are relevant on a global scale in achieving climate justice, as well as 
the growing pervasiveness of normative values such as ‘the polluter pays’ and the 
‘atmospheric trust’ concept (an expansion of the public trust doctrine). At the same time, 
transnational frameworks such as the Oslo Principles and Principles on Climate Obligations 
for Enterprises have identified a series of climate change obligations which can be applied to 
companies.31 Similar to tobacco litigation of the past, Carbon Majors have undeniably 
developed an understanding of their contributions to climate change yet have taken little action 
to amend their behaviours and have often taken steps to mislead the public.32 Certainly, big 
oil companies have followed in the footsteps of their tobacco counterparts as similar trends of 
‘discovery, investigation, concealment, obfuscation—often spanning decades, has been 
extensively documented across an array of public health and environmental issues’.33 The 
                                               
28Noel Hutley SC and Sebastian Hartford Davis, ‘Climate Change and Directors’ Duties’ (2019) 
Supplementary Memorandum of Opinion available at, https://cpd.org.au/2019/03/directors-duties-
2019/, accessed 25 July 2020. 
29 Ibid at 3. 
30 Geetanjali Ganguly et al op cit note 2 at 850. 
31 Expert Group on Global Climate Obligations, Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change (2015 
Eleven International Publishing). 
32 Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), ‘Smoke and Fumes’ (November 2017) at 25 
available at, www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Smoke-Fumes-FINAL.pdf, accessed 24 July 
2020  
33 Ibid. 
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legacy of tobacco litigation also indicates that knowing one’s activities are causing 
catastrophic climate change outcomes, is significant in respect of defrauding shareholders. 
Such an approach has been instituted against Exxon Mobil under the USA’s Martin Act, which 
grants the New York state attorney general the authority to pursue investigations and actions 
against those it suspects of securities fraud.34 This is one of the first cases to be heard where 
climate change disclosure has taken centre-stage for an allegation of securities fraud.  
 
Of particular relevance to the continent of Africa is the evolution of the constitutional context, 
a phenomenon within the Global South that is enhancing climate litigation attempts more 
broadly. The emergence of modern Constitutions in a post-liberation era have seen human-
rights-related arguments emerge as a dominant litigation strategy. This ‘human rights turn’35 
in climate litigation is notably more prevalent in the developing world where, arguably, the spirit 
of human rights claims is more desperate due to their populations’ high vulnerability to the 
risks associated with climate change.36 In respect of a rights-centred approach to climate 
litigation, and in particular the development of private climate litigation, Africa has an immense 
contribution to make. This is because a number of African jurisdictions have recognised the 
right to a healthy environment and the role of governments in enforcing this right against 
private bodies.37 Africa is undeniably ripe for realising the full potential for a horizontal 
application of environmental rights in a climate context to hold private entities legally 
responsible and to afford the victims of rights violations adequate recourse.  
 
2. The Influence of a Rights-Based Approach on Private Climate Change 
Litigation 
Litigation directed at holding private parties responsible for their climate change contributions 
is being supported by a ‘rights-turn’ in climate change litigation more generally.38 The rights 
approach has emerged from a public litigation context against government authorities, based 
on a vertical application of human rights and their interconnectedness with surrounding 
environmental conditions.39 This marks a redirection from the traditional approach in public 
                                               
34 The Martin Act, N.Y. General Business Law Article 23‑A, §§ 352 et seq. (Act), is New York’s broad 
‘blue sky law.’ 
35 Jacqueline Peel and Hari M. Osofsky, ‘A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?’ (2018) 7 
Transnational Environmental Law, 37. 
36 Louis Kotzé, ‘Human Rights, the Environment and the Global South’, in S. Alam et al. (eds), 
International Environmental Law and the Global South (2015) 178–9. 
37 Keely Boom, Julie-Anne Richards and Stephen Leonard, ‘Climate Justice: The International 
Momentum towards Climate Litigation’ (2016) available at, 
https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/report-climate-justice-2016.pdf, accessed 23 June 2020. 
38 Jacqueline Peel and Hari M. Osofsky op cit note 35. 
39 For example, Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018). 
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climate change disputes whereby governments are challenged for failing to properly consider 
environmental risks in their decision-making processes40 – although this approach is not 
always mutually exclusive from a rights-based one. This progression to rights-based 
arguments has been catalysed by the incorporation of specific environmental rights in various 
Human Rights Instruments and Constitutions with proven correlations to stronger 
environmental management and an increase in environmental challenges brought before the 
courts.41 This Section acknowledges the broad success of rights-based climate change 
litigation and comments on how this approach can easily translate to obligations imposed on 
private parties through a horizontal application of environmental and associated rights.  
 
Two cases are noteworthy in illustrating a recent receptiveness to an emerging rights-based 
jurisprudence - these are the Leghari and Urgenda cases, based in Pakistan and the 
Netherlands respectively. Prior to these judgments, the traditional rights-based approach 
struggled with the obstacle of attributing human rights violations to greenhouse gas emissions, 
especially where such harm is merely predicted or whether rights protections need to be 
applied extraterritorially.42 The issue of attribution is also prevalent within the first wave of 
private climate litigation, with similar scientific and political developments now able to 
overcome such a hurdle by establishing a causal connection between climate disaster and the 
infliction of harm to humans. New rights-based arguments gained significant attention in 2015, 
when a Dutch environmental group call the Urgenda Foundation and 900 Dutch citizens sued 
the Dutch government for a failure to adequately address climate change.43 The Hague District 
Court ordered the government to more carefully consider international scientific 
recommendations in taking more prudent measures to tackle greenhouse gas emissions. 
Although the initial finding of the Hague District court was historical in substantiating a State’s 
duty of care towards its citizens, the real human rights discourse came later in 2018 when the 
Dutch government appealed the matter.44 Whereas the Hague District Court did not find that 
the government had violated the human rights of the petitioners, the Court of Appeal built its 
reasoning almost entirely on the right to life and the right to private and family life under Articles 
2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court of Appeal summarized the 
position on State duties as follows: 
                                               
40 For example, Massachusetts supra note 9 generally considered a landmark lawsuit, considered and 
interpreted the Clean Air Act and whether the US EPA had wrongfully decided to not regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
41 Chris Jeffords and Joshua C. Gellers, ‘Constitutionalizing Environmental Rights: A Practical Guide’ 
(2017) 9 Journal of Human Rights Practice, 136. 
42 Jacqueline Peel and Hari M. Osofsky op cit note 35 at 46. 
43 Urgenda Foundation v. State of the Netherlands [2015] HAZA C/09/00456689. 
44 The State of the Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation, The Hague Court of Appeal (9 October2018), 
case 200.178.245/01 (English translation). 
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‘the State has a positive obligation to protect the lives of citizens within its jurisdiction 
under Article 2 ECHR, while Article 8 ECHR creates the obligation to protect the right to 
home and private life. This obligation applies to all activities, public and non-public, 
which could endanger the rights protected in these articles, and certainly in the face of 
industrial activities which by their very nature are dangerous. If the government knows 
that there is a real and imminent threat, the State must take precautionary measures to 
prevent infringement as far as possible’.45 
 
The Appeal Court found that climate change poses a real and imminent threat to human rights, 
whilst the District Court took a more interpretive approach in using rights to inform an 
understanding of the State’s duty of care - a breach of which is an unlawful act under Dutch 
tort law.46 Consequent emission targets set by the Dutch government and the introduction of 
a Climate Bill47 in the Netherlands, means that future Urgenda-like arguments in the 
Netherlands are unlikely.48 However, the proposition of ‘future rights violations’ remains 
relevant and will serve to strengthen similar arguments in regions where environmental and 
climate change frameworks are limited in imposing duties on governments to take protectionist 
action. On December 20, 2019, the Dutch government failed in a second appeal to the 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands, which upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal under 
Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR.49 Unfortunately, Urgenda stopped short of applying the principle 
of ‘pro-rata responsibility’ to private entities, as the idea of pro-rata liability is connected only 
insofar as ‘joint and individual responsibility’ is apportioned to signatories to the UNFCCC, 
being States.50 Therefore private emitters can only be apportioned any sort of liability 
vicariously through the State.  
 
Similarly, the Lahore High Court in Pakistan did not make any clear annunciation on the liability 
of private entities in the Leghari case; however, it perhaps went further than the Urgenda case 
to acknowledge the normative concept of ‘climate justice’ as a construct which must transform 
its predecessor, ‘environmental justice’. In its ground-breaking decision holding the Federal 
                                               
45 Ibid para 43. 
46 Suryapratim Roy and Edwin Woerdman, ‘Situating Urgenda v the Netherlands within Comparative 
Climate Change Litigation’ (2016) 34  Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law at 172. 
47 Bill on a framework for policy development aimed at reducing Dutch emissions of greenhouse 
gasses in order to limit global warming of the Earth (Climate Act), Parliamentary Doc. 2017–2018, 34 
534, No 10. 
48 Jonathan Verschuuren, ‘The State of the Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation: The Hague Court of 
Appeal upholds Judgment requiring the Netherlands to further reduce its greenhouse gas emissions’ 
(2019) 28 Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 94. 
49 Supreme Court of the Netherlands ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007. 
50 Ibid para 5.6.4. 
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Government of Pakistan and Regional Government of Punjab accountable for their inaction 
and delay in implementing the Government’s National Climate Change Policy 2012 and the 
Framework for Implementation of Climate Change Policy (2014-2030); 51 the court stated the 
following: 
 
‘Climate Justice links human rights and development to achieve a human-centered 
approach, safeguarding the rights of the most vulnerable people and sharing the 
burdens and benefits of climate change and its impacts equitably and fairly. […] Who is 
to be penalised and who is to be restrained?’52 
 
The Urgenda and Leghari cases heralded a turn in public climate change litigation, one 
specifically based on the promotion of human rights, which led to the emergence of similar 
cases being brought in various other jurisdictions.53 These State-directed challenges also 
contributed to a global impetus to hold all contributors to climate change responsible. The 
growing success of rights-based approaches to climate change litigation are based largely on 
two factors: 1) access to justice in conjunction with climate or environmental rights; and 2) 
judicial opportunism.54 These factors are equally relevant to the development of private climate 
litigation against corporate entities. The enshrinement of environmental rights in various 
Constitutions is serving to ‘set them above the vicissitudes of everyday politics and this is also 
effectively to raise them above the possibility of routine democratic revision’.55 The rise of 
environmental rights has been identified as a significant contributor to the shift from viewing 
climate change as a political issue to one of individual concern and ultimately individual 
rights.56 This has been coupled with a number of helpful factors, including the rise of 
transnational human rights frameworks and judicial networks.57 
 
In a private context, this momentum has already extended to efforts against the Carbon 
Majors. In another striking example of ‘judicial opportunism’, the Commission on Human 
Rights of the Philippines (CHR) announced at the end of 2019 that 47 investor-owned 
                                               
51 Ashgar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan (W.P. No. 25501/2015), Lahore High Court Green Bench, 
Orders of 4 Sept. and 14 Sept. 2015, available at https://elaw.org/pk_Leghari (Leghari). 
52 Ibid para 21. 
53For example: Juliana v. United States supra note 39; Third Runway at Vienna International Airport 
case, Case No. W109 2000179-1/291E, Federal Administrative Court, Austria, 2 Feb. 2017; and 
Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others [2017] ZAGPPHC 58, 
Judgment of High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria (South Africa), 8 Mar. 2017. 
54 Joana Setzer and Lisa Benjamin, ‘Climate Litigation in the Global South: Constraints and 
Innovations’ (2020) 9 Transnational Environmental Law at 80. 
55 Tim Hayward, Constitutional Environmental Rights (2005) 129. 
56 Geetanjali Ganguly et al op cit note 2.  
57 Ibid. 
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corporations, including ExxonMobil, Chevron, Shell, BP, Total, Sasol and Repsol, can be 
found to be both legally and morally liable for a number of human rights violations against the 
Filipinos resulting from climate-related disasters. Although the approach of the Commission 
was dialogical, rather than adversarial, the Commission recognised that the results of the 
Inquiry could be relied upon by rights-holders as a foundation for filing claims for punitive 
damages at a later stage.58 Panel Chairman Commissioner Roberto Cadiz, stated that 
National Human Rights Institutions have a role to play in testing boundaries and creating new 
paths - ‘to be bold and creative, instead of timid and docile; to be more idealistic, and less 
pragmatic; to promote soft laws into becoming hard laws; to be able to see beyond legal 
technicalities and establish guiding principles that can later become binding treaties’.59  
 
This Inquiry will undoubtedly have far-reaching consequences for the private sector, with the 
intention to help clarify the standards for corporate reporting in respect of their greenhouse 
gas emissions and the consequent impacts of their activities on climate change. Following the 
Philippines Inquiry, Island nations in the Pacific including Vanuatu, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Fiji and 
Solomon Islands also declared their intent to bring legal action against big polluters.60 
Similarly, the case of Luciano Lliuya v. RWE AG was brought in Germany by a Peruvian farmer 
for a declaratory judgment and an award of damages against RWE, Germany’s largest 
electricity producer.61 The German court dismissed the claim on the basis that no linear causal 
chain could be established between Luciano Lliuya’s account of the melting of mountain 
glaciers near his home town of Huaraz and the greenhouse gas contributions of the German 
electricity supplier. However, this matter is currently on appeal as the appeals court found 
Luciano’s complaint to be well-pled and admissible. The case will move into an evidentiary 
phase and hear expert testimony on whether:62 
 
a) There is a serious threat to the defendant’s property due to the increase in volume of 
the lake in which the glacier is melting into; 
b) The defendant’s power plants are contributing to global greenhouse gas emissions, 
resulting in co-causation of the glacier melting. 
Whilst the court is yet to weigh up all evidence, this is already a significant legal development 
                                               
58 CHR Philippines, CHR concluded landmark inquiry on the effects of climate change to human 
rights; expects to set the precedent in seeking climate justice (Press Release Dec. 13, 2018) available 
at, http://chr.gov.ph/chr-concluded-landmark-inquiry-on-the-effects-of-climate-change-to-human-
rights-expects-to-set-the-precedent-in-seeking-climate-justice/, accessed 15 July 2020. 
59 Ibid.  
60 People’s Declaration for Climate (8 June 2015, Justice Port Vila, Vanuatu).  
61 Lliuya supra note 19. 
62 Order to parties to submit evidence (unofficial English translation) 1-5 U 15/17 2 0 285/15 
Landgericht Essen. 
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in holding corporate entities liable for climate change damages and suggests that the causal 
links between rights violations and emitting greenhouse gases is more widely accepted by 
judiciaries. Public rights-based arguments against States have undeniably addressed some 
of the inadequacies surrounding the establishment of such a causal connection and have laid 
the groundwork for advancing arguments of contributory harm and pro-rata responsibility. 
Luciano Lliuya v. RWE AG thus reflects a culmination of the progress made in trans-
jurisdictional matters, particularly insofar as these developments can be applied to private 
entities. Luciano Lliuya v. RWE AG also illustrates how civil law regimes are being infiltrated 
by a climate change agenda. Here, the claim was based on nuisance under German law as 
informed by property rights under the German Civil Code; however, an increasing 
pervasiveness of environmental principles such as the ‘polluter pays’ is apparent. 
 
The rights-based approach has made significant leaps which are relevant to both streams of 
climate change litigation: State-targeted and private. This is fundamentally attributed to 
progressive procedural requirements, the adoption of environmental rights and environmental 
legislation which permits access to justice by those who have had their rights infringed. If these 
are supporting factors, then a closer look at the African context and its elevation of 
environmental rights places the continent at a significant advantage for these types of claims 
directed towards private parties. The recognition of constitutional environmental rights also 
provides strong avenues for horizontal application; whereby private parties may fall under a 
direct or indirect application of a set of environmental standards. The next section explores 
how the African continent has already made progressive inroads in applying environmental 
rights horizontally and how climate considerations are increasingly explored in a rights context 
against private entities. 
 
3. Africa’s Horizontal Application of Environmental Rights 
Despite Africa’s particular vulnerability and lack of resilience in respect of climate change, 
coupled with environmental rights enshrined in many post-liberation constitutions, the 
continent has not yet contributed significantly to the growing global body of climate change 
disputes.63 To date, there have been only 6 cases bringing the issue of climate change before 
African courts and all of these have been actions against government bodies for primarily 
failing to consider climate change in respect of administrative procedures. South Africa, 
having the most developed environmental management framework, holds the majority of 4 
                                               
63 Louis Kotze and Anél du Plessis, ‘Putting Africa on the Stand: A Bird’s Eye View of Climate Change 
Litigation on the Continent’ (2019) University of Oregon's Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 
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cases, the most recognised of which is the Earthlife v Thabametsi case.64 All of these have 
involved challenges to environmental authorisations granted under the National 
Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (“NEMA”), for reasons including, inter alia, failing 
to adequately consider climate change factors in environmental impact authorisation (EIA) 
procedures.65 Similarly, in Kenya, the EIA process was challenged in granting a licence to 
Amu Power Company to proceed with a coal-fired power plant project in the County of Lamu 
in the Save Lamu v Amu Power Co Ltd case. The National Environmental Tribunal found that 
the Respondents’ EIA had failed to, inter alia, fully consider the project’s contribution to climate 
change and accepted arguments that this was inconsistent with Kenya’s low carbon 
development commitments. South Africa and Kenya both enjoy a constitutionally-enshrined 
right to a healthy environment,66 which is protected by national laws through their respective 
EIA procedures and legislative frameworks, with Kenya also boasting a Climate Change Act.67 
The South African and Kenyan judgments therefore have powerful resonating effects insofar 
as affirming that EIA procedures must consider climate change risks in order to give effect to 
environmental rights. However, these cases do not provide much in the way of developing an 
understanding of the enforcement of environmental rights against private parties. 
 
In Nigeria, the climate change case of Gbemre v Shell Petroleum68 has gone further in terms 
of substantive engagement with rights, even though the arguments of the complainant were 
not based on an existing and specific environmental right – but rather the incorporation of 
environmental factors into other rights. In a stark horizontal application of rights to private 
entities, a Federal High Court in Nigeria held that the practice of gas flaring in the Niger Delta 
is unconstitutional and violates the fundamental rights of life and dignity as provided for in the 
Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria and the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights. The plaintiffs also argued that the practice of gas flaring leads to the emitting of 
greenhouse gases which contributes to climate change and could lead to further rights 
violations. The court did not make any specific declaration on this point, but its declaration on 
direct rights violations by the Defendant is significant in signalling a very early judicial 
                                               
64 Earthlife supra note 53. 
65 The other three include: Philippi Horticultural Area Food & Farming Campaign and Another v MEC 
for Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning: Western Cape and Others 
(16779/17) [2020] ZAWCHC 8; 2020 (3) SA 486 (WCC) (17 February 2020); Trustees for the Time 
Being of the GroundWork Trust v. Minister of Environmental Affairs, KiPower (Pty) Ltd, and Others 
(filing date 2017) case no. 54087/17 (still pending); GroundWork v the Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and the President (filing date 2019) case no. 24571/19 (still pending). 
66 Section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996; and Articles 42 and 
70 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
67 Climate Change Act 11 of 2016. 
68 Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Co., Suit No. FHC/CS/B/153/2005 (hereinafter Gbemre). 
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receptiveness to tackling climate change with a robust rights-based agenda.69 The Gbemre 
case was heard in 2005, which was undeniably revolutionary for its time.  
 
Although not considered a climate change case, Kenya easily accepted a horizontal 
application of constitutional environmental rights as early as 2010, in the case of Abdalla 
Rhova Hiribae and Others v. Attorney General and Others.70 This is indicative of its new post-
2010 constitutional era, which does not consider rights as exclusively concerned with the 
relationship between the State and individuals.71 The petitioners in this case alleged that the 
respondents failed to develop a comprehensive land use master plan for guiding land use, 
development, livelihood and biodiversity/ecological protection, and in failing to do so, they had 
violated the petitioners’ rights to life and a healthy environment.72 The National Environmental 
Management Authority opposed the matter on the ground that joinder of all respondents was 
inappropriate as ‘only the state can guarantee fundamental rights’ and therefore the court has 
no jurisdiction to entertain the petition.73 It argued that ‘there is only vertical application of 
human rights, no horizontal’, thus the petition is devoid of merit.74 The court explained that the 
new constitutional dispensation in the general and the Bill of Rights in particular: 
 
‘applies to and binds all persons represents a radical departure from the position under 
the former Constitution where only the state could be held liable for violation or 
infringement of constitutional rights. In my view, where the facts so demonstrate, an 
individual or corporate person . . . can be held to have violated another person’s 
constitutional rights, and appropriate orders or declarations issued.’75 
 
This is aligned with an understanding of Article 20(2) of the Kenyan Constitution which 
supports a case-by-case approach in determining whether constitutional rights apply 
horizontally. Article 20 states that the ‘Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds all state organs 
and all persons’ and that ‘[e]very person shall enjoy the rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the Bill of Rights to the greatest extent consistent with the nature of the right or fundamental 
freedom’.76  
                                               
69 Unfortunately, this ruling faced various issues of implementation: Hari M Osofsky, ‘Climate Change 
and Environmental Justice: Reflections on Litigation over Oil Extraction and Rights Violations in 
Nigeria’ (2010) 1 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 189. 
70 HCC No. 14 of 2010. 
71 Brian Sang, ‘Horizontal Application of Constitutional Rights in Kenya: A Comparative Critique Of 
The Emerging Jurisprudence’ (2018) 26 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1. 
72 Abdalla Rhova Hiribae supra note 70 para 3.  
73 Ibid para 20. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid paras 46 – 7. 
76 Article 20(1) and 20(2) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
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Similarly, South African constitutional jurisprudence, coupled with the environmental right 
framed in Section 24 of the Constitution, places South Africa in an ideal position for the 
horizontal application of environmental rights – a monumental advantage in litigating climate 
change disputes against private entities. However, the horizontal application of those rights 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights has not always been a straightforward matter. Section 8(2) of 
the Constitution declares that the Bill of Rights is binding for natural and juristic persons, ‘if 
and to the extent  that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature 
of any duty  imposed by the right’. The interpretation afforded by the Du Plessis judgment77 of 
the Interim Constitution’s correlating section 7(1) is that the chapter (i.e. Bill of Rights), ‘shall 
bind all legislative and executive organs of state at all levels of government’, and therefore 
constitutional rights merely enjoy indirect effect in private relationships between private 
entities.78 However, this view is no longer valid and given the wording of the Section 24 right 
to an ‘environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being’; a private entity can easily 
violate such rights and are oftentimes greater contributors than state-entities to gross human 
rights violations, as seen in the Gbemre case. If there is any lingering doubt pertaining to the 
horizontality of South Africa’s environmental right, Judge Dennis Davis clarifies the application 
of the Bill of Rights to private parties in McCarthy v Constantia Property Owners Association 
and Others.79 Judge Davis was generous in granting locus standi to those who ‘have come to 
court to protect the environmental fabric of their suburb’.80 He also clarified that Section 8(2) 
provides that the Bill of Rights binds juristic persons and, 
 
‘is not only designed to introduce the culture of justification in respect of public law but 
intended to ensure that the exercise of private power should similarly be justified. 
Accordingly the carefully constructed but artificial divide between public and private law 
which might have dominated our law prior to the constitutional enterprise can no longer 
be sustained in an uncritical fashion and hence unquestioned application’.81  
 
Section 24 is thus seemingly predestined for horizontal application with the environmental right 
being enforceable between private parties even where no legislative or common law rule 
                                               
77 Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC), 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1 (May 15, 1996). 
78 Ibid para 41: the Court based its reasoning on German constitutional law doctrine. 
79 1999 (4) SA 847 (C). 
80 Ibid at 855F. 
81 Ibid at 855C-E; see also Michael Kidd, ‘Suburban aesthetics and the environment right. McCarthy 
and others v Constantia Property Owners Association and others 1999 (4) SA 847 (C)’ (1999) 6 South 
African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 257. 
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provides for such a claim.82 If no rule exists, then Section 8(3) mandates the courts to develop 
such a rule. In essence this means that where a private actor pollutes a natural resource, such 
as water, a violation of the environmental right under section 24(a) can be alleged.83 
Furthermore, the horizontal application of the South African environmental right is beginning 
to emerge more blatantly in South African judicial proceedings, with related rights such as 
access to information also having horizontal application in respect of environmental disclosure 
and reporting. The forthcoming section explores South Africa’s potential for applying its 
environmental right horizontally in achieving successful climate change litigation against 
private entities. Of particular relevance is the Company Secretary of Arcelormittal South Africa 
v Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance case,84 whereby the Courts reaffirmed that under South 
Africa’s constitutional dispensation, ‘there is no room for secrecy and that constitutional values 
will be enforced’ against juristic persons.85 
 
4. A Horizontal Perspective of South Africa’s Right to a Healthy Environment and 
Interrelated Rights 
The South African Constitution enshrines a comprehensive and widely-celebrated substantive 
environmental right, which is capable of both vertical and horizontal application.86 Despite the 
existence of a fully-fledged environmental right, environmental constitutionalism in South 
Africa is generally exercised through the utilisation of procedural rights in the narrow sense.87 
As such, the substantive environmental right is ‘underutilised’ in litigation that seeks to protect 
the environment.88 As noted by Feris, ‘when one examines South African jurisprudence, there 
seems to be a marked dearth of cases where the environmental right has been fully utilised 
and clearly interpreted’.89 The Arcelormittal case marks a decisive break from this pattern and 
exhibits a wholesome understanding of the interdependency of rights and, in line with thick 
                                               
82 Carola Glinski, ‘Environmental Justice in South African Law and Policy’ (2003) 36 Verfassung und 
Recht in Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America at 59. 
83 Hichange investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd t/a Pelts Products and Others 2004 
JDR 0040 (E). 
84 Company Secretary of Arcelormittal South Africa and Another v Vaal Environmental Justice 
Alliance (69/2014) [2014] ZASCA 184; 2015 (1) SA 515 (SCA); [2015] 1 All SA 261 (SCA) (26 
November 2014) hereinafter Arcelormital. 
85 Ibid para 82. 
86 Anél du Plessis, ‘South Africa’s Constitutional Environmental Right and the Pursuit of a Country 
where “Well-being” Thrives’ (2017) in UN Environment, New Frontiers in Environmental 
Constitutionalism at 249; Loretta Feris, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine and Liability for Historic Water 
Pollution in South Africa’ (2012) 8 Law Environment and Development Journal at 17. 
87 Melanie Murcott, ‘The Procedural Right of Access to Information as a Means of Implementing 
Environmental Constitutionalism in South Africa’ in Erin Daly and James May (eds) Implementing 
Environmental Constitutionalism: Current Global Challenges (2018) 196. 
88 Loretta Feris, ‘Constitutional Environmental Rights: An Under-Utilised Resource’ (2008) 24 South 
African Journal on Human Rights at 29; see also Michael Kidd, ‘Greening the Judiciary’ (2006) 9 
Potchefstroom Electronic Review 72. 
89 Loretta Feris ibid at 29. 
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environmental constitutionalism, affirmed and extended the horizontal application of the 
environmental right. Although not considered a climate case in the strict sense, Arcelormittal 
may have important and far reaching implications for future private climate litigation in South 
Africa. 
 
Arcelormittal concerns litigation based on the right to access of information instituted by a 
nongovernmental environmental advocacy organisation, the Vaal Environmental Justice 
Alliance (VEJA), against South Africa’s largest steel producer, Arcelormittal South Africa Ltd.90 
In 2011, VEJA initiated a campaign to access environmental information from Arcelormittal, 
specifically the company’s Environmental Master Plan pertaining to the rehabilitation of the 
Vanderbijlpark site.91 The information sought by VEJA would reflect whether or not 
Arcelormittal had complied with its own environmental strategy as well as with the 
requirements of the licences issued by various governmental departments under 
environmental legislation. VEJA asserted that it had a right to access Arcelormittal’s records 
in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act92 (PAIA). The PAIA allows for the 
horizontal enforcement of the right to information in cases ‘where information is required for 
the protection of any rights’.93 In its request, VEJA claimed that the requested records were 
necessary for the protection of the environmental right, which is also a horizontally enforceable 
right.94 
 
Arcelormittal adopted an obstructive stance and disputed that VEJA required the requested 
records for the protection of the environmental right.95 Additionally, Arcelormittal claimed that, 
through requesting the records, VEJA was usurping the state’s role in enforcing the regulatory 
provisions of environmental legislation.96  Navsa ADP, writing for the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(SCA), rejected Arcelormittal’s arguments through the application of thick environmental 
constitutionalism and a rights-based approach to environmental litigation. The Supreme Court 
of Appeal (SCA) upheld the order of the High Court and directed Arcelormittal to deliver the 
requested records to VEJA within 14 days. Although the order of the court was limited to simply 
granting access to information, the approach taken by the court offers valuable insights into 
the horizontal application of the environmental right in South Africa and illustrates the immense 
potential for a rights-based approach to private climate litigation in the future.  
                                               
90 Arcelormittal supra note 84 at para 2. 
91 Ibid para 8. 
92 The Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
93 See s 50(1)(a) of the PAIA. 
94 Arcelormittal supra note 84 paras 8-9. 
95 Ibid paras 11–15 and 83 
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www.city.ac.uk/law 
2020/13 
21 
 
 
Despite the applicant’s reliance on the procedural right of access to information, as enshrined 
in the PAIA, the Arcelormittal judgement provided a vivid illustration of environmental 
constitutionalism as the environmental harms of polluting industries occupied centre stage 
throughout the litigation.97 Navsa ADP highlighted Arcelormittal’s ‘acknowledged history of 
operational impact on the environment’98 and wrote the judgement from the need to ‘reset our 
environmental sensitivity barometer’ in the face of climate change.99 This is a welcome change 
from many narrowly cast cases where requests for access to information are disconnected 
from, or treat as peripheral, the environmental harms in relation to which the information is 
sought and the everyday struggles of those affected by such harms.100  
 
Through a solid grounding of the procedural issues in the context of a rights-based approach, 
the court was able to engage with the substantive rights that underlie VEJA’s request for 
information in an expansive and integrated manner. In line with the principle of 
‘interdependency’ that has been endorsed by various human rights instruments101, the court 
exhibited an acute awareness of the direct correlation that substantive rights have on one 
another by recognising the effect of environmental degradation on the South African 
population.102 Environmental ruin can have tremendous implications for the attainment of 
social justice, equality and dignity as ‘the environment and nature...create the conditions for 
social justice.’103 
 
Not only did the judgement recognise the symbiosis between substantive rights, it also 
recognised the mutually-reinforcing nature of procedural and substantive rights. The court 
reasoned that the procedural right to information was fundamental to the full expression of the 
environmental right and thus, too, pivotal in ensuring the full enjoyment of various 
interconnected socio-economic rights.  In so doing, the court traversed various provisions in 
South Africa’s environmental legislative framework that pursue social justice and link issues 
of transparency and participation to environmental protection.104  
 
                                               
97 Melanie Murcott op cit note 87 at 201. 
98 Arcelormittal supra note 84 para 52. 
99 Ibid para 84. 
100 Melanie Murcott op cit note 87 at 200. 
101 See for example the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World 
Conference on Human Rights, June 1993, UN Doc A/Conf 157/23, Part I, para 5. 
102 Arcelormittal supra note 84 para 52, where the court linked environmental degradation, such as the 
negative effects on air and water quality, to the rights of individuals and communities. 
103 David Schlosberg, ‘Theorising Environmental Justice: The Expanding Sphere of a Discourse’ 
(2013) 22 Environmental Politics at 38. 
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Through an application of transformative environmental constitutionalism, the court extended 
the application of environmental principles to the private actors responsible for environmental 
degradation. This extension takes cognisance of the fact that in certain instances, private 
abuses of human rights may be as noxious as those committed by the State.105 Of particular 
relevance, the court affirmed the potential for the horizontal application of s 2(4)(k) of NEMA, 
which mandates that environmental decisions ‘must be taken in an open and transparent 
manner, and access to information must be provided in accordance with the law.’106 This 
symbolises a pioneering judicial development as although it is uncontroversial that the 
provisions of PAIA may apply to corporations, the horizontal application of the principles of 
NEMA, prior to the Arcelormittal judgement, was debatable.107 This development is consistent 
with the emerging acceptance that corporations must respect human rights, particularly those 
related to the environment.108 In reinforcing Arcelormittal’s environmental corporate 
accountability, Navsa ADP rejected Arcelormittal’s refusal to disclose the documents 
requested by VEJA.  
 
Although Arcelormittal is not considered a climate case in the strict sense, as Kim Bouwer 
notes, a preoccupation with the ‘holy grail’ cases of climate litigation may result in other cases 
being overlooked.109 This necessitates the consideration of cases which pursue private law 
pathways and where issues of climate change are less ‘visible’ and the connection to domestic 
climate policy is generated ‘inadvertently’.110 In order to illuminate these cases it is necessary 
to analyse ‘litigation “in the context of” climate change, as well as litigation “about” climate 
change’.111 Indeed, there are important takeaways from the Arcelormittal judgment that 
indicate the advantage of having a horizontally enforceable environmental right in the context 
of private climate litigation.  
 
First, the judgment in Arcelormittal provides a vivid depiction of the strength of an integrated 
rights-based approach to pursue private environmental litigation in South Africa. The 
judgement is testament to the fact that litigation based on procedural rights can be enriched 
and strengthened by linking the procedural right with the relevant substantive right. 
Augmenting procedural rights with substantive rights serves to position litigation within the 
                                               
105 Iain Currie & Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000) 41. 
106 Arcelormittal supra note 84 para 66. 
107 See s 2(1) of the NEMA, which reads: ‘The principles set out in this section apply throughout the 
Republic to the actions of all organs of state that may significantly affect the environment… (emphasis 
added)’. 
108 Justine Nolan, ‘With Power Comes Responsibility: Human Rights and Corporate Accountability’ 
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context of the environmental harms suffered and the social injustices they produce.112 This 
was demonstrated in Arcelormittal as the court did not limit the scope of its analysis to the 
procedural right of access to information, but also focussed on the protection of the 
environment and the issues of equality and human dignity linked to it. This is particularly salient 
in the African context, and in the Global South more broadly, where climate cases evince a 
‘stealthy’ strategy.113  Applicants often rely on procedural rights to tackle climate related issues, 
which tends to result in cases of ‘incidental climate litigation’.114 Given the prevailing lacuna in 
jurisprudence pertaining to the content of the environmental right in South Africa, it is unlikely 
that it will be invoked directly in climate litigation. Rather, litigants are likely to continue to place 
a heavy reliance on procedural rights. However, Arcelormittal reveals that augmenting 
procedural rights with the substantive environmental right creates the opportunity for the 
judiciary to engage with the substantive issues in the case.  
 
Such engagement is significant in light of the judiciary’s goal of transformative 
constitutionalism. It must be borne in mind that the South African Constitution is symbolic of 
the country’s ideological and de iure fracture from the oppressive apartheid regime and its 
fresh commitment to transformation.115 Although not contributing significantly to our 
understanding of the content of the environmental right, the court in Arcelormittal hinted 
towards the judicial recognition that a sound environment constitutes the foundation upon 
which constitutional values can be realized, enhanced and protected.116  As John Knox 
proclaimed: ‘human rights are grounded in respect for fundamental human attributes such as 
dignity, equality and liberty.  The realization of these attributes depends on an environment 
that allows them to flourish’.117   
 
Climate change presents a ‘wicked’ problem in that it manifests as more than a mere 
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environmental crisis, but has broader socio-economic consequences.118 It is well understood 
that the poorest in society suffer a disproportionate burden of the social, economic and health 
consequences that accompany environmental degradation.119 Given the enduring nature of 
socio-economic inequality in South Africa, addressing climate change is a human rights priority 
that cannot be delayed. Our courts have been tasked with implementing a process of 
transformative constitutionalism, which envisions the Constitution as vehicle for transforming 
South African society into one which is more democratic, participatory and egalitarian.120 This 
transformative judicial milieu bodes well for prospective private climate litigation in South Africa 
and may possibly place applicants at a unique advantage in obtaining a favourable outcome.  
Second, although Arcelormittal involved the procedural right of access to information, the court 
affirmed that the substantive environmental right operates horizontally. In fact, the court went 
one step further in declaring that the environmental legislative provisions aimed at ensuring 
the full expression of the environmental right also operate horizontally.121 This development is 
of particular importance in light of emerging trends in the second wave of private litigation, 
which seek to hold corporations liable for failure to disclose climate related information.122 In 
South Africa, most large companies adhere to certain sustainability guidelines, indices and 
governance codes which promote good corporate sustainability practices and reporting. The 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange’s Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) Index, the King Code 
on Corporate Governance for South Africa and the Global Reporting Initiative Guidelines all 
are premised on a company’s own assessment of its environmental performance.123 
Consequently, many cases of environmental non-compliance go undisclosed or are reported 
as being of ‘minor’ relevance.124 Notably, Eskom which is South Africa’s electricity provider 
and biggest greenhouse gas emitter only discloses its direct emissions and has not yet set 
targets to reduce its future emissions.125  
 
The Constitution is premised on a clutch of aspirational values that should permeate all of 
                                               
118 See Jim Perry, ‘Climate Change Adaption in the World’s Best Places: A Wicked Problem in Need 
of Immediate Attention’ (2015) 133 Landscape and Urban Planning 1. 
119 Barry Levy and Jonathan Patz, ‘Climate Change, Human Rights, and Social Justice’ (2015) 81 
Annals of Global Health 318. 
120 Karl Klare, ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal 
on Human Rights at 150. 
121 Arcelormittal supra note 84 paras 61-66. 
122 See discussion in section 2 above. 
123 The Centre for Environmental Rights, ‘Full Disclosure: The Truth about Corporate Environmental 
Compliance in South Africa’ (2015) at 6, available at, 
https://fulldisclosure.cer.org.za/2015/download/CER-Full-Disclosure.pdf, accessed 2 August 2020. 
124 Ibid. 
125 The Centre for Environmental Rights, ‘Full Disclosure 5: The Truth about South African Banks’ and 
Companies’ Ability to Identify and Address Climate Risks’, available at, 
https://fulldisclosure.cer.org.za/2019/, accessed 2 August 2020. 
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South African society.126 The court in Arcelormittal recognised that the right to a healthy 
environment is inextricably linked to these aspirational values. Similarly, the procedural right 
of access to information is fundamental in ensuring the full expression of the substantive 
environmental right and thus, too, to the aforementioned values. As South African courts have 
already displayed a willingness to create new legislative goals by interpreting existing 
legislation to require additional climate related considerations127, it would not be out of kilter 
for our judiciary to interpret existing corporate sustainability guidelines and indices as requiring 
adequate climate-change-related disclosures. This is palpable in light of the expansive and 
integrated approach taken by the court in Arcelormittal, which acknowledged the 
interdependency of the substantive environmental right and the procedural right of access to 
information.  
 
In light of the potential for climate change to ossify and heighten inequality, it may be argued 
that the judicial interpretation of existing corporate reporting standards in South Africa as 
requiring sufficient climate disclosures is necessary in terms of the judiciary’s commitment to 
transformative constitutionalism, a commitment that is significantly aided by the horizontal 
application of rights. This implies that in order for companies to act in accordance with the 
fundamental values of our Constitution, they should at the very least disclose the relevant 
information necessary for individuals to enforce and uphold the environmental right.128 
Ultimately, the failure to disclose relevant climate information may equate to a violation of the 
environmental right itself and the plethora of socio-economic rights and constitutional values 
that are inextricably linked to the integrity of the environment. The Arcelormittal judgement 
makes it explicitly clear that corporate disclosures of environmental information, which would 
include climate-related considerations, are necessary for fostering social justice, equality and 
dignity through empowering South Africans who are affected by environmental harm to protect 
the environment and pursue a just and equitable society that promotes their dignity.129  
 
5. Conclusion 
Although rights-based arguments in the context of climate litigation are emerging as 
successful strategies in a public law context, their potential for private climate litigation is yet 
to be fully explored in evolving discourse. There are strong legal and moral obligations for 
                                               
126 See s 1(a)-(d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
127 See Earthlife supra note 53. 
128 Our courts have emphasised the important role that private parties play in enforcing the 
environmental right in Arcelormittal and Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources and Others 
(CCT 80/08) [2009] ZACC 14; 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC) ; 2009 (10) BCLR 1014 (CC) (3 June 2009). 
129 Erin Daly and James R. May, ‘Bridging Constitutional Dignity and Environmental Rights 
Jurisprudence’ (2016) 7 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment at 3. 
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private polluters to be held directly responsible for their climate change contributions; however, 
the legal tools for doing so have only recently become available. This Paper has presented 
the strength of a constitutionally enshrined environmental right in achieving both climate 
justice and its less visible ally, environmental justice. The horizontal application of an 
environmental right lays the groundwork for pursuing multiple pathways to combat climate 
change through private law, which recognises the interconnectedness of a healthy 
environment and socio-economic rights. Given the recognition of an environmental right in 
many African constitutions, Africa still has much to contribute to the growing body of rights-
based climate litigation – albeit, these might not present themselves as ‘silver bullet’ climate 
cases, but have the potential to expand upon various justifications for attributing rights 
violations to private parties.  
 
In order to realise the full potential of the right to a healthy environment in a private context, it 
has been submitted that environmental rights be engaged with substantively in order to 
supplement the ‘tried and tested’ procedural approach, which can only go so far in advancing 
a set of rights-based arguments. Indeed, it is the mandate of South Africa’s commitment to 
transformative constitutionalism to contribute to an understanding of the environmental right 
which must necessarily address the climate injustices exacerbating inequality and impacting 
on the human dignity of its citizens. Ultimately, Arcelormittal confirms that all the dominos are 
aligned for South Africa to be engulfed by its own wave of private climate litigation. All that 
remains is for the first one to topple. And hopefully, in the right direction. 
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